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1.  Wei Liaoweng (1178–1237), also known by his style name, Heshan (the crane mountain), was a Southern Song Neo-Confucian scholar 
and official.
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Explanatory Note
With respect to scholarship on Song China (960–1279), there have existed two theories concerning the nature of its po-
litical system. On the one hand, the Song has been considered to be a period of autocratic government, when the highly devel-
oped centralized bureaucracy enabled a system in which the emperor had the final decision-making power. On the other hand, 
due to the phenomenon of constant political dominance by powerful grand councilors in the late Northern Song, there has also 
been a view that the Song was a time when the power of grand councilors was strengthened. These two ways of understanding 
differ in that the former focuses on political changes at the macro level, while the latter tends to capture those political changes 
from a relatively microscopic perspective. This article attempts to use an approach that integrates the aforementioned two 
arguments by examining changes in political space between the Northern (960–1127) and Southern Song (1127–1279). More 
concretely, through an analysis of Wei Liaoweng’s “Sealed Memorial in Response to the Edict,” it investigates changes in the 
relations between the emperor and his officials, as well as changes in the nature of policy making, which are closely related to 
the emperor’s power.1 The conclusions drawn from the analysis are as follows.
Wei Liaoweng’s “Sealed Memorial in Response to the Edict” reveals the following political changes: having experi-
enced the New Policy reforms during the years of Xining (1068–1077) and Yuanfeng (1078–1085), the Southern Song further 
moved towards an era of autocratic grand councilors, such as Qin Gui, Han Tuozhou, and Shi Miyuan. Wei regarded this pe-
riod as a major change. According to Wei’s memorial, power became concentrated in the hands of certain grand councilors or 
in institutions connected to the grand councilors. Correspondingly, the various functions of the “attendant officials,” “censors 
and remonstrators,” “Classics Colloquium,” “proclamation drafters,” “auditors,” and so forth declined, and thus the system 
that connected the bureaucracy to the emperor weakened. In other words, the shrinking space for the emperor’s participation 
in politics resulted in the dominance of powerful grand councilors.
This change was clearly demonstrated in the form of officials’ audiences with the emperor. The ceremony of “overseeing 
of the court,” where the emperor dealt with government affairs, was comprised of the “regular court” (i.e. the qiju, a ceremony 
held every five days in which court officials greeted the emperor) and the “auditing government” (a meeting in which the 
emperor made decisions based on discussions with his officials). From the second half of the Tang Dynasty, these two had 
tended to become increasingly separate, and the importance of the “auditing government” ceremony (i.e. the court audiences) 
increased. While the Song court continued the practices of the late Tang, it developed a system in which the emperor moved 
among several palaces to hold audiences with various officials and hear their “debates.” This system in turn can be divided 
into “memorializing in separate groups” and “memorializing in a combined group.” In the first half of the Northern Song, the 
development of audiences called “memorializing in separate groups” (in which several different groups of officials took turns 
reporting to the emperor) allowed the emperor to listen to ideas of many different officials. During the Yuanfeng reforms of the 
bureaucratic system in the 1080s, however, “memorializing in a combined group” (in which officials would report to the em-
peror in a single group) was established. While rigorously excluding other officials, this type of meeting tended to strengthen 
the ties between the emperor and grand councilors, and especially between the emperor and certain grand councilors. In a 
similar fashion, from the end of the Northern Song, the practice of “imperial handwritten edicts” was developed, in which the 
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I. Introduction
With respect to the dynamics of change in pre-modern Chinese society, Song (960–1279) historians have set 
out on their research from two different directions. One group takes a macroscopic perspective and focuses on 
the changes in political or economic systems. For example, historical materialism, as Marx and Engels propose, 
suggests that based on the changes in relations of production, all societies in the world follow the same steps of 
evolution: from ancient slave society, to medieval feudalism, and then to modern capitalism.2 The theory of oriental 
despotism proposed by the Association of Chinese History in Japan emphasizes that throughout Chinese history, 
from the Qin Dynasty (221 BC–206 BC) and Han Dynasty (206 BC–220 AD) to the collapse of the Qing Dynasty 
in 1911, the state system experienced no significant changes (Adachi 1998). In this system, self-employed small 
farmers had a wide presence, and power was concentrated in the hands of the emperor. Alternatively, in Japanese 
scholarship, there is an influential theory of periodization proposed by Naitō Konan and Miyazaki Ichisada: that is, 
the “Tang-Song Transition.” It proposes significant changes in politics, the economy, society, and culture between 
the Tang (618–906) and the Song. With respect to politics, the aristocratic politics of the Tang (a system in which 
the emperor consulted with aristocrats about politics) evolved into the monarchical autocracy of the Song (a system 
in which the emperor exercised the ultimate power built on a highly developed and centralized bureaucracy). In re-
cent years, the appearance of rubrics such as the “Northern-and-Southern-Song transition,”3 the “Song-Yuan-Ming 
transition,” and the “Late-Ming-Early-Qing transition” demonstrate that scholars have moved beyond looking at 
the changes between Tang and Song, to consider changes between the two parts of the Song, the transitional Song, 
Yuan, and Ming periods, and even beyond toward the transition of the late Ming and early-Qing periods.4 All of the 
above research, however, focuses on changes in the systems at the macro level, such as politics and the economy.
The “political system” that I refer to in this article is a comprehensive entity that includes lower-level govern-
ment systems such as civil administration, finance, military administration, and transportation. It is reasonable to 
explore the changes in political systems over the course of the Song by considering how the “Kaifeng System” 
2.  Meanwhile, Marx does point out that there is a model of “Asian relations of production” that distinguishes itself from the European one. This 
idea led to Karl August Wittfogel’s argument (1991) and the arguments of the scholars of the Association of Chinese History in Japan.
3.  The Song Dynasty, which began in 960 and continued until 1279, is divided into two distinct periods: the Northern Song (960–1126) and 
the Southern Song (1127–1279). In 1126 the Song lost control of northern China to the Jin Dynasty (1115–1234). Meanwhile, the Song 
court retreated south of the Yangtze River and continued the dynasty. Because the capital was relocated in Hangzhou, this part of Song was 
dubbed the Southern Song by people after the Song, while the first half of the dynasty (prior to 1126) became known as the Northern Song. 
(translation note)
4.  For the periodization mentioned, see Hirata (2004; 2006) and Kishimoto (2012).
emperor and grand councilors made policies through the exchange of documents. The “imperial handwritten edicts” replaced 
the traditional form of document processing that had centered on Three Departments and Six Ministries with a mechanism of 
decision-making involving only the emperor and grand councilors.
Based on the description above, below we attempt to reconcile the two arguments introduced in the beginning of this 
note: imperial autocracy versus the rising power of grand councilors. If we take the macroscopic perspective of looking at the 
political system, in terms of field administration, it changed from the Northern Song “Kaifeng System” into the Southern Song 
“Hangzhou system.” The former refers to a centralized system, where the military and financial systems were concentrated in 
the imperial capital of Kaifeng; and the latter refers to a decentralized, lower-level government system, where the military and 
financial power were dispersed in several places including the capital Hangzhou, and where circuit officials were endowed 
with considerable authority. At the higher level of the system of imperial autocracy, however, there was not much change be-
tween the Northern Song and the Southern Song. On the other hand, however, if we take a microscopic perspective, changes 
took place in nature of the relations between the emperor and officials, as well as in the methods of policy making, which were 
closely connected to imperial power. In this sense, some aspects of the political system of imperial autocracy failed to function 
fully, and thus led to the monopoly of power by grand councilors.
The original version of this article appeared in the leading academic journal on Asian history Toyoshi Kenkyu (No. 72-3, 
2013), issued by Toyoshi Kenkyukai. Translation permission has been granted by the headquarters of the Toyoshi Kenkyukai.
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evolved into the “Hangzhou system.”5 The former refers to a system that functioned through the centralized bureau-
cracy of the Northern Song, and that was based on a country-wide system of logistics connecting the northwestern 
borderlands (military), the imperial capital (politics), and the lower Yangtze River area (sources of revenue). The 
latter refers to the Southern Song system, a regional regime relying on very close military, political, and economic 
connections within the restricted territories, after the loss of north China with the fall of the Northern Song (Mi-
yazawa 1988; Chap. 1; Nagai 2000).6 For example, in the Southern Song, there appeared regional administrations, 
such as the offices of overseer-general (zongling suo), the offices of director-general (zongdu fu), the pacification 
commission (xuanfu si), and the offices of military commander (zhizhi si). They took charge of both the military 
and financial administration of jurisdictions covering large areas. They held more remarkable power than circuit 
officials7 did in the Northern Song, which indicated a decentralized structure of the system. I have studied this topic 
mainly from the perspective of the transmission of official documents (Hirata 2007; 2009). For reasons of space, I 
will not repeat my findings here, but merely point out the direction of this research. 
The second main approach that Song historians have taken is one that explores changes from a microscopic per-
spective. It is difficult to understand changes in the political or the economic system at the macro level within a short 
period of time. Nevertheless, it is equally important to discover and discuss relatively small changes. Let us take 
the topic of political changes for example. The American political scientist Harold Dwight Lasswell (1959) defines 
politics as social relations in which power is exercised. In this dynamic view, politics can be boiled down to: “Who 
gets what, when, how.” Lasswell’s research model examines politics from a structural perspective, such that politics 
is comprised of complex relations of certain subjects, time, space, and means.8 To investigate political changes in 
accord with this model, the changes in the relationships between the emperor and ministers and the changes in the 
forms of decision making that are closely related to the imperial power become important topics.
In order to explore the patterns of policy making in the Song, it is necessary to consider two types of politi-
cal space: the space where state councilors9 proposed, examined, and discussed policies; and the space where the 
emperor made final decisions based on these proposals, examinations, and discussions of policies. The theory of 
“monarchical autocracy” raised by Naitō Konan and Miyazaki Ichisada can be seen as emphasizing the second 
space mentioned above. Miyazaki (1963) clearly stated: “the extremely multi-faceted direct contacts between the 
emperor and ministers like this was a characteristic of rule from the Song on, and imperial autocracy was developed 
and consolidated thereby.” On the other hand, judging from the fact that from the late Northern Song on autocratic 
grand councilors continuously came to power, there is another argument that describes the Song as a period when the 
power of grand councilors got strengthened (Wang 1995). These two arguments are contradictory at the first sight. 
But if the aforementioned generalization makes sense, we can see the theory of “monarchical autocracy” as focus-
ing on macro political changes, while the strengthening of grand councilors’ power, or the continuous emergence 
of autocratic grand councilors, reflects political change at the micro level. Focusing on the micro political changes, 
particularly changes in political space, this article will attempt to reconcile these two theories.
5.  Kaifeng was the imperial capital of the Northern Song, while the Hangzhou was that of the Southern Song after 1132. Kaifeng is located 
along the Yellow River and in current Henan Province. Hangzhou is located south of the Yangtze River, in current Zhejiang Province. 
(translation note)
6.  The Southern Song established four Offices of Overseer Commander, in Zhenjiang, Jiankang, Ezhou, and Lizhou Prefectures respectively. 
Wei Liaoweng discussed the importance of the four strategic sites bordering with the Jurchen Jin, Tangut Xixia, and Mongols in his memorial 
“On selecting people to lead the garrisons in four strategic sites in preparation for the Jin and Xia barbarians” in The Complete Collected 
Works of Wei Liaoweng [He Shan Xian Sheng Da Quan Ji], vol. 16.
7.  Counties (xian) were the basic formal unit in the hierarchy of territorial administration throughout imperial history, Prefectures (fu/zhou/jun/
jian) were the key units of territorial administration overseeing several counties, headed by prefects. Circuits refer to the largest territorial 
administrative jurisdictions in the Song: circuits were clusters of neighboring prefectures. Each circuit was headed by one or more Circuit 
Supervisors. Circuits served as the coordinating link between prefectures and the central government (Hucker, 1985). (translation note)
8.  Concerning Lasswell’s understanding, see Miyazawa (1994).
9.  “State Councilors” was a collective term referring grand councilors and vice grand councilors, that is, the highest officials of the state. 
(Hucker 1985). (translation note)
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II. Features of Imperial Audiences during the Song
In this article, I use the term “imperial audiences” (gozen kaigi; lit. “meetings in front of the emperor”) for an 
analysis of political space. Admittedly, this term was not used during the Song dynasty. Regarding Song contempo-
rary terms, perhaps the most appropriate one is “overseeing the court” (shichao), as used in the item “overseeing the 
court in the Chuigong Palace” (Chuigong dian shichao) in the first section on “ceremonial procedure,” (yizhi 1) in 
the Song Dynasty Manuscript Compendium (Song Huiyao Jigao).10 Moreover, elsewhere I have discussed Song po-
litical space through the examination of the term “consultations,” (dui) which refers to an institution where officials 
directly reported to the emperor (Hirata 1994). In my opinion, to clarify the circumstances of “imperial audiences” 
through employing the frequently used Song terms, such as “audiences” and “discussion” (yi), is likewise an effec-
tive way to study Song political space.
The reason to use the term “imperial audiences” in this article is that the direct interactions between the em-
peror and officials can clearly demonstrate the features of the political space at that time.11 Examples of imperial 
audiences can be found in modern Japan. On August 9 and 14, 1945, two imperial audiences with the emperor were 
held in order to discuss whether to accept the Potsdam Declaration proposed by the Allies. The agreements reached 
in the audiences included accepting the Potsdam Declaration, which led to the end of the war on August 15, 1945.12 
In the Japanese language, the term “imperial audiences” refers to “meetings concerning important and emergent 
national affairs, held by senior statesmen and ministers with the emperor’s attendance, under the Meiji constitution” 
(Wide garden of words 2008). In Japan under the constitutional monarchy, the number of the imperial audiences 
held during the reign of the Showa Emperor was surely not large. By contrast, in China under absolute monarchy, 
it goes without saying that imperial audiences played a significant role in policy making. Moreover, in addition 
to “overseeing the court,” other occasions where the emperor directly interacted with officials included various 
forms of audiences, such as “consultations after the Classics Colloquium”13 and “night consultations at the Hanlin 
Academy.”14 This article broadly defines “imperial audiences” as discussions between the emperor and officials, 
including all the forms of audiences and consultations mentioned above.15
The following part of this section will briefly discuss the features of imperial audiences. Li You’s Facts of the 
Song Dynasty (Songchao Shishi), volume three, “Sacred learning” (shengxue) records:
10. Sometimes, Chinese scholars use the word “juece” (decision making) as an alternative. For example, Zhu (1996: chap. 3) discusses 
“The system of central policy-making” under the categories of  “Memorializing in a combined group and in separate groups of the Two 
Administrations (i.e. the Secretariat-Chancellery and the Bureau of Military Affairs);” “Memorials and audiences of officials,” “Individual 
audiences of ministers,” “The official business of censors and remonstrators,” “Memorializing by the Four Circuit Supervisorates and 
Military Commissions,” “Discussions of the lecturers of the Classics Colloquium,” and “Petitions from scholars and commoners.”
11.  Japanese scholars such as Matsumoto (2006) have used the word “imperial audiences” in the analysis of Chinese history.
12. Ōe (1991) discussed the fifteen audiences during the Second World War.
13. The Classics Colloquium refers to a gathering of the Emperor with eminent civil officials of the general administrative agencies in the 
capital, including the Hanlin Academy, the Directorate of Education (guozi jian) etc., for the reading and discussion of classical and historical 
texts. The Hanlin Academy was a loosely organized group of litterateurs who did drafting and editing work in the preparation of the more 
ceremonial imperial pronouncements and the compilation of imperially sponsored historical and other works (Hucker ,1985). (translation 
note)
14. Lü Zhong’s Lectures on Major Events of the Imperial Dynasty (Huangchao Dashiji Jiangyi), Vol. 2, “memorialization and audiences” records 
“According to the tradition of the imperial dynasty, [memorialization and audiences include] summoning of councilors, discussions with 
Attendants, consultations after Classics Colloquium, night consultations at the Hanlin Academy, audiences with the Two Scribes on duty, 
summoned consultations with officials, sequential consultations with the various officials, farewell audiences with circuit commissioners, 
sealed memorials of the Three Institutes, special invited audiences with minor officials, [underline added] petitions of officials and commoners 
through the petition box, memorials of local administrator sent through official post stations, and memorials send by post stations in the 
capital. Therefore, there was not a single day when it was impossible to have audiences, and there was not a single person who could not 
express his ideas.”  The underlined parts are various types of audiences. Therefore, it is evident that the emperor had many other chances to 
contact directly with officials besides “overseeing the court.”
15. I have discussed this topic elsewhere and only provide some summaries of my research here. For detailed discussion, see Hirata (2010; 
2012a).
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After his succession, Emperor Zhenzong [i.e. the third emperor of the Song Dynasty, r. 997–1022], every morning sat 
in the front palace, where officials of Secretariat-Chancellery, Bureau of Military, State Finance Commission, Kaifeng 
Prefecture, and Judicial Control Office, as well as officials who requested for audiences, took turns to memorialize. Af-
ter the hours of dragon [7am–9am], [the emperor] entered the inner palace for breakfast and soon went out to sit in the 
back palace, reviewing military affairs until noon. In the evening, [the emperor] summoned the reader-in-waiting and 
expositor-in-waiting [of the Hanlin Academy] for advice on government affairs. Sometimes [the emperor] returned to 
his resting palace late at night. From then on, this [schedule] became regular.
This is “memorializing in separate groups,” (fenban zoushi, a form of audience in which several different groups 
took turns presenting memorials to the emperor), which will be discussed further below. On these occasions, groups 
of officials, principally heads or deputy heads of governmental offices, went to discuss with the emperor one after 
another. Given the intrinsic limits of space, we cannot imagine this as an occasion where all the officials gathered 
together in front of the emperor to discuss government, as in “the ceremonial audience of all officials” (baiguan da 
qiju). Moreover, with respect to the number of groups, in the first half of the Northern Song there were five, but in 
the latter half this was changed to two. Accordingly, those who could carry out “consultations” with the emperor 
were gradually limited to officials of the state-councilor level.
In addition, “consultations” can be divided into four types based on the frequency of meetings with the emper-
or: (1) Consultations with grand councilors. As the heads of all officials, grand councilors needed to attend the audi-
ences with the “five groups” or “two groups.” Besides that, they enjoyed a privilege other officials did not have, that 
is, certain grand councilors could stay for “individual consultations” (liushen dudui) with the emperor after regular 
audiences; (2) Consultations with ministers of the Six Ministries (shangshu liucao) or censors-and-remonstrators 
(taijian). Being the heads of major governmental departments, the six ministers enjoyed opportunities for audiences 
second only to state councilors. Meanwhile, censors and remonstrators, as the officials who supervised the govern-
ment and made remonstrations, were endowed with opportunities for “consultations” equal to those of the ministers 
of the Six Ministries. Even in the period when audiences were limited to “two groups,” censors and remonstrators 
were still allowed to have audiences before others, because their memorializing was considered to be “public busi-
ness”; (3) Consultations with attendants (shicong) and lecturers of the Classics Colloquium (jingyan guan). Serving 
as the councilors of the emperor, attendants “discussed their thoughts and contributed ideas” (lunsi xianna) and thus 
enjoyed the privileges of consultation second only to categories (1) and (2). In addition, after the Classics Collo-
quium, certain officials participating in the Colloquium would be asked to stay for “consultations after the Classics 
Colloquium” (jingyan liudui). In other cases, Hanlin Academicians and lecturers of the Classics Colloquium on 
night duty would be summoned to the inner palace for the “night consultations with the Hanlin Academy” (Hanlin 
yedui); (4) The “farewell audiences (ruci, shortly before an official left to take up his position),” “periodic audiences 
(rujian, when a local official was summoned to the court during his current tenure),” and “acknowledgement audi-
ences (ruxie, when a local official finished a tenure)” of important local administrators. Circuit-level officials and 
prefects of major prefectures were allowed “consultations” before their departure to their posts or after they finished 
their tenures. This category also includes the “rotating consultations” or “sequential consultations” (zhuandui or 
lundui) available to all court officials. Approximately every five days, at the time of “ceremonial audiences in the 
inner palace” (neidian qiju), one or two officials who wanted to have audiences with the emperor were selected to 
meet with him.
In terms of the locations of imperial audiences, they can be divided into audiences in the front palace (the 
Chuigong Palace) and those in the back palace (Chongzheng Palace or the Yanhe Palace). First of all, grand coun-
cilors, the six ministers, and the heads and deputies of major governmental offices took turns having “consultations” 
in the front palace. Then censors and remonstrators were also specially permitted to have “consultations” there. An 
audience in the front palace was a very formal occasion, where the emperor dressed up in “court dress” (chaofu) 
when meeting officials. In most cases, when “consultations” took place, eunuchs and imperial diarists were expected 
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stay away so that the emperor and his officials could have confidential conversations.16 Concerning the Tang-Song 
transition, it is noteworthy that during the Tang Dynasty, officials were offered seats, served with tea, and discussed 
governmental affairs with the emperor in a relaxed manner. That was based on the traditional ideal of “sitting down 
and discuss the Way” (zuo er lun dao). From the Song Dynasty on, officials had to stand during audiences.
Shortly after the audiences in the front palace, the emperor would take a short rest in the inner palace before he 
started the audiences in the back palace, where the emperor could wear more comfortable clothes while meeting his 
officials. On these occasions, on the one hand officials who had not finished their “consultations” in the front palace 
could continue their conversations with the emperor. On the other, those who were excluded from audiences in the 
front palace now had the chance to “consult” with the emperor. Other audiences that took place in the back palace 
included the “farewell audiences,” “periodic audiences,” and “acknowledgement audiences” of local officials, “se-
quential audiences” of all court officials, or the “presentation audiences” (yindui), where promoted officials were 
presented by the Ministry of Personnel and Office of Military Commanders to meet the emperor. It was recorded 
that the Office for Audience Ceremonies presented relevant officials to the emperor for “rotating” and “sequential 
consultations.” It is therefore possible that on occasions like this, the personal attendants of the emperor were also 
present. In addition to audiences in the back palace, “consultations after the Classics Colloquium” and “night con-
sultations at the Hanlin Academy” in the inner palace were also held in a relaxed format—officials were permitted to 
sit and were offered tea. For example, scholars have argued that during the reign of Emperor Xiaozong (1162–1189), 
the emperor often held “inner invitations” and “night consultations” in the Xuande Palace, which thereby became an 
important alternative to the official “overseeing the court” as a space for audiences (Wang 2012a).
The change from “memorializing in separate groups” to “memorializing in a combined group” is one of the 
most significant issues in the examination of imperial audiences. During most of the first half of the Northern Song, 
except when Emperor Renzong specially employed combined audiences for the purpose of discussing problems 
with the Xixia, imperial audiences generally took the form of “memorializing in separate groups.”17 In the wake 
of the Yuanfeng Reforms of the bureaucratic system,18 however, “memorializing in a combined group” gradually 
became the regular form of audience—the heads of the Three Departments all together, or joined by the heads of 
the Bureau of Military Affairs, had audiences with the emperor (Kumamoto 2003; Wang 2012b). I have examined 
elsewhere the form of “memorializing in a combined group” based on Zeng Bu’s Preserved Records of Lord Zeng 
(Zenggong Yilu) (Hirata 2011). I would like briefly to describe this form of audience below.
The practice of imperial audiences began with the “collective memorializing” (tongcheng), in which officials of 
the Three Departments and the Bureau of Military Affairs together had “consultations” with the emperor, after which 
“follow-up consultations” (zaidui), were held individually with these two groups. The issues addressed during the 
“collective memorializing” included frontier defense, diplomacy with and defense against the neighboring countries 
of the Liao and the Xixia, judgments made by the Case Review Section, important personnel issues concerning 
military officials, enfeoffments of vassal states, inquiries after the health of the emperor and the princes, rituals 
concerning the regency of the empress, the funeral ceremony for Emperor Zhezong (r. 1085–1100), and the restora-
tion of the Yuanyou Empress. In short, “collective memorializing” was basically an occasion when officials of the 
Three Departments together discussed important military and diplomatic affairs with the emperor. The subsequent 
16. When examining the process of policy making, it is necessary to consider questions such as: Were people serving the emperor close by, such 
as eunuchs and diarists, present on the occasions of audiences? Did eunuchs and maids-in-waiting play any part in the exchange between 
emperor and officials? For example, in the Edo Shogunate, when the Shogun talked with councils (rōjū, Japanese counterpart of grand 
councilors in China), officials called “lord chamberlain” (osoba goyō toritsugi) were involved. Both the direct discussions on policies with 
the Shogun and communications through official documents had to go through the “lord chamberlain.” As a result, those in this position 
actually wielded more power than the councilors (Ōishi 1995). Nevertheless, it is evident in the Song sources about audiences that officials 
particularly requested the emperor to keep eunuchs away, which indicates that audiences were at least principally direct interactions between 
the emperor and officials.
17. The Xixia (1038–1227), a Tangut regime occupied what are now the northwestern Chinese provinces of Ningxia, Gansu, eastern Qinghai, 
northern Shaanxi, northeastern Xinjiang, southwest Inner Mongolia. It had constant wars with the Liao and Song and was able to maintain 
its rule until 1227, when the Mongol put an end to it. (translation note) 
18. During the years of Yuanfeng (1078–1085), Emperor Shenzong initiated reforms of the bureaucratic system, claiming them to be on the Tang 
model of Three Departments and Six Ministries. (translation note)
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“follow-up consultations” were occasions where the Three Departments alone consulted on administrative issues, 
while the Bureau of Military Affairs alone consulted on military-diplomatic affairs. This form of imperial audiences 
was described in the seventh volume of Preserved Records by Lord Zeng, under the item recording the first day of 
the fifth month in the second year of Yuanfu (1099):
[After] the ceremonial audience [qiju] in the Chuigong Palace, the emperor moved to the Wende Palace for overseeing 
the court, and then retired. Thereafter, officials memorialized in the Chuigong Palace. In the collective memorializing, 
Zhang Zi suggested sending armies to the city of Nanmouhui [newly seized from the Xixia] to build military fortifica-
tions. The Case Review Section requested the appointment of a prosecutor. The emperor decreed that Ye Zuqia, be 
appointed, but [the grand councilor Cai] Bian disagreed. The emperor then appointed An Dun. Bian commented: “That 
would be fine.” [During] the follow-up audience, I [i.e. Zeng Bu, the head of the Bureau of Military Affairs] said: 
“Bian selected the prosecutor. What is his intention? I have attempted to explain [to your Majesty] that ‘[Jian] Xuchen 
had many partisans. I’m afraid there will be a number of them who will try to save him.’ [But] your majesty doubted 
there was anyone who would dare to save him. [Now you see] my words turn out to be not nonsense.” Cao Song 
beseeched to remove his military power, [but the emperor] declined. Cai Jing and others memorialized to send func-
tionaries [qinshi guan] to learn foreign languages, [and the emperor] approved. A non-Han soldier [named] Chiduobu 
serving in Huanqing Circuit reported people seeking refuge with the Song from the western barbarians [i.e. the Xixia]. 
Although he should have been exempted [from death penalty] because of the [imperial general] amnesty, [the court 
decided to] execute him for this special case. The Commander-in-chief of the Palace Command had sentenced Wei Ji 
improperly. The Kaifeng Prefectural government had already received the imperial order and exonerated him, [and 
therewith] sent an official document to the palace audience gate informing [the Commander to] thank [the emperor]. 
Picture 1. Map of the imperial palace of Kaifeng in the Song (from A Comprehensive Record of the Forest of 
Affairs (Shilin Guangji), the Yuan edition). The street that connects the Donghua Gate and Xihua Gate divided the 
inner court from the outer court. 
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I argued that this was inappropriate. The emperor agreed and commanded that the officials of the Kaifeng Prefectural 
government could be exempted from punishment, but the staffs and clerks of the Palace Command should be sent to 
the Court of Judicial Review for prosecution. After the audience, [I] informed the Three Departments to set regulations 
for cases like this. The grand councilor [Zhang Dun] resolutely argued that [officials of Kaifeng prefectural office] 
should not be simply exonerated.
Since it was the first day of the fifth month, an audience in the Wende Palace was added after the regular audience 
in the Chuigong Palace. The source records that the imperial audiences started with collective memorializing of 
the Three Departments and Bureau of Military Affairs concerning issues of frontier defense and the judgments by 
the Case Review Section. It then continued as the Bureau of Military Affairs reported alone to the emperor in the 
“follow-up consultation.” After the “follow-up consultation,” Zeng Bu forwarded his conversation with the emperor 
to the Three Departments for further discussion. The Preserved Records by Lord Zeng recorded many examples of 
the conjunction of imperial audiences and meetings among grand councilors. The two consecutive parts of impe-
rial audiences— the “collective memorializing” and the “follow-up consultations”—shaped the way in which the 
adjustment of policies was made. This source did not mention the Executive Office of the Department of State Af-
fairs (dutang), where state councilors exchanged their ideas and formulated policies. Nevertheless, given the regular 
process of decision making of state councilors (first court audiences, followed by gathering in the Executive Office 
of the Department of State Affairs, and then returning to each department and putting policies into execution), it 
is likely that the exchange of ideas and decision making of the state councilors revolved around the discussions in 
imperial audiences.19
The example of Preserved Records by Lord Zeng cited above demonstrates that changes in political space, 
represented by the change from “memorializing in separate groups” to “memorializing in a combined group,” was a 
major dynamic of political transformation from the Northern Song to the Southern Song. This work depicts constant 
disputes between Zhang Dun, Cai Bian, and Zeng Bu that took place in front of Emperor Zhezong.20 More specifi-
cally, it depicts how the two grand councilors (Zhang Dun and Cai Bian) in charge of the Three Departments, and the 
head of the Bureau of Military Affairs (Zeng Bu), contested for power through their skillful use of “consultations” 
with the emperor. As the antagonism between Zhang Dun, Cai Bian, and Zeng Bu indicates, it was actually difficult 
reach consensus in meetings of grand councilors. Zeng Bu eventually expressed his opinions through his direct com-
munications with the emperor in “follow-up consultations” and by “staying behind for individual consultation.” This 
19. Besides the Executive Office of the Department of State Affair, there were other places that were frequently used for the meetings of state 
councilors. For example, Preserved Records by Lord Zeng records: “[we state councilors] withdrew the East Palace Gate and got together 
in the Hall of Grand Councilor [chengxiang ting], discussing the issue of the posthumous title of the late emperor’s consort, entitling Prince 
Shen and, promoting the authorities of the two palaces [i.e. the emperor and the empress dowager], and the issue concerning the empress.” 
(Vol. 9, the item of “the day of Xinsi in first month of the third year of Yuanfu (1100)”). Also it is recorded that “on the day of Jiayin, in 
preparation for the imperial sacrifice to heaven to report the posthumous name of the deceased emperor, [we] fasted and stayed overnight 
in the Department of State Affairs, gathering in the Hall of Vice Director of the Left [zuo puye ting]. [I] met Bangzhi [Li Qingchen], 
Chongyuan, Yingshu [Jiang Zhiqi] for twice.” (Vol.9, the item of “the day of Jiayin in the fourth month of the third year of Yuanfu”). 
It is therefore evident from the sources that the meetings of state councilors also took place in other locations such as the Hall of Grand 
Councilor and the Hall of Vice Director of the Left. Moreover, when state councilors left the imperial city, they went back to the “East-and-
West Administrations” [dongxi fu]. It is very likely that discussions were also held in the “East-and-West Administrations.” For example, 
Preserved Records by Lord Zeng has words such as “later [I] met Chongyuan, and thus talked to him…”(Vol.8, the item of the day of 
Dingyou in the eighth month of the second year of Yuanfu), “later [I] met Shipu [Han Zhongyan] and others, who all argued…” (Vol.9, the 
item of “the day of Guiyou in the fifth month of the third year of Yuanfu”). These texts are very possibly the records of the meetings in the 
“East and West Administrations.” For similar issues, see Extended Continuation to Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance (Xu Zizhi 
Tongjian Changbian), vol. 358, the item of “the day of Gengxu in the seventh month of the eighth year of Yuanfeng (1085)”: “The Three 
Department and the Bureau of Military Affairs said: ‘regarding collective [proposals of] appointments and memorials, those issues that need 
to go through discussions should be discussed collectively in the Executive Office of the Department of State Affair beforehand. If [officials] 
return to the East and West Administrations, allow them to visit one another for discussion through the side door.’ [The emperor] approved.”
20. Regarding political history during the reign of emperor Zhezong, see Yang (2012). This book examines the topic in detail. It reveals the 
networks of the factional group of Zhang Dun and Cai Bian. Nevertheless, this book does not effectively examine the system of policy 
making. It does not fully answer questions such as: “By what means did Zeng Bu singlehandedly, almost without any personnel support, 
manage to make Zhezong take him words and thus exert his political influence?” I would like to point out that the imperial audiences 
comprised of “collective memorializing,” “follow-up audiences,” and “individual audiences” should be the key to this question.
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tendency was already evident when Wang Anshi21 served as the grand councilor in 1070s.22 Is it possible that the de-
velopment of the institutions of “imperial endorsements” and “handwritten edicts” (shouzhao), which strengthened 
the direct connection between the emperor and grand councilors from Emperor Huizong’s reign (1100–1125) on, 
represent the documentary institutionalization of the “individual consultations” that allowed the emperor to com-
municate with certain grand councilors individually?
Furthermore, Kumamoto (2007) points out that after the Yuanfeng reforms of the bureaucratic system, the dis-
parity of power between the grand councilors and vice grand councilors intensified, and grand councilors dominated 
the “memorializing in a combined group.” In other words, when “memorializing in a combined group,” it was easier 
for the more powerful grand councilors to express their political opinions.
The next section of this essay examines Wei Liaoweng’s “Sealed Memorial in Response to the Edict” that 
Emperor Lizong (r. 1224–1264) issued on the first day of the first month in the first year of Duanping (1234). The 
edict stipulated that “all officials, no matter whether they are civil or military, court or local, or senior or junior, shall 
submit sealed memorials discussing the successes and failures of the court government, and the gains and losses 
within and without [the regime], without reservation.”23 Through the examination of Wei’s memorial, I will elucidate 
my understanding of the various issues discussed above. 
III. Changes in Political Space Between the Northern Song and the 
Southern Song
Wei Liaoweng (1178–1237; courtesy name Huafu; studio name Heshan) was born in Qiongjiang county in 
Xiang prefecture, Sichuan, southwest China. He received the jinshi degree24 at the third place in 1199, and then 
served as prefect of Han, Mei, and Lu prefectures. During his stay in Sichuan for about seventeen years, he built the 
Heshan Academy to spread Neo-Confucianism. In the first year of Baoqing (1225) of Emperor Lizong’s reign, Wei 
was sentenced to house arrest in Jing prefecture due to impeachment by Zhu Ruichang. Nevertheless, he returned to 
the court after the death of the autocratic grand councilor Shi Miyuan, and then served as the Academician of Duan-
ming Palace, notary of the Bureau of Military Affairs, inspector of the armies in the Jinghu region, and so forth. He 
was celebrated as a representative Southern Song writer and philosopher. The eightieth volume of Major Schools 
21. Wanng Anshi (1021–1086) was the grand councilor between 1069 and 1076 during Emperor Shenzong’s reign. In faced with the state 
financial crisis, Wang attempted major socioeconomic reforms. These controversial reforms and political purges against those against them 
divided officials into majorly two factions: the reformists led by Wang Anshi, and the conservatives, surrounding around another statesman, 
Sima Guang. (translation note)
22. It is evident in “Lü Hui’s memorial to Empeor Shenzong about Wang Anshi’s ten fraudulent behaviors” (Memorials of Various Officials 
in the Song Dynasty (Songchao Zhuchen Zouyi), vol. 109) that Wang Anshi made use of “staying for individual audiences” to make his 
ideas heard by the emperor. Individual audiences therefore could have been used as a political means to carry out new policies. In addition, 
Xu Du’s Quesao Bian records: “According to the history of the Tang, Yao Chong did not get along with Zhang Yue when he was the grand 
councilor. One day, during the imperial audience, Yao Chong dragged as if he was sick. The emperor therefore asked him to stay and talk with 
him. When Jiang Sheng served as the Hanlin Academician, the emperor liked and trusted him very much. One day, when his ideas interested 
the emperor, he was asked to stay for three times. [The emperor then] said: ‘From now on I would not have individual audience with you 
anymore.’ Sheng was confused. Before long, he was appointed Jointly Manager of Affairs with the Secretariat-Chancellery. Therefore it 
is clear that Tang grand councilors could not have individual audiences. In our dynasty, state councilors collectively memorialize. When 
an official has secret issues to report, he must apply to the Office for Audience Ceremonies, having them send the request to the emperor. 
After the collective memorializing, this official could alone stay. This is called staying for individual audiences, slightly different from the 
Tang forms.” Apparently, if a single grand councilor wanted to memorialize to the emperor, he needed to send “secret notes” to the emperor 
through the Office for Audience Ceremonies, and then stayed for individual audiences after the regular audiences. Individual audiences 
provided grand councilors great opportunities to convince the emperor with their words. Nevertheless, gradually autocratic grand councilors 
excluded other state councilors from staying for individual audiences (Hirata 2008).
23. The “Sealed Memorial in Response to the Edict” was preserved in Wei Liaoweng’s Complete Collected Works of Wei Liaoweng (Heshan 
Xiansheng Daquan Wenji), vol. 18. Among various editions of this book, the Si Bu Cong Kan edition said to be better. However, this article 
used the text from Zeng Zaozhun and Liu Lin eds., Complete Literature of the Song [Quan Song Wen] (Shanghai Cishu Chubanshe and 
Anhui Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2006), vol. 7057 “Wei Liaoweng 5,” pp. 115–138. In addition to Wei Liaoweng’s “Sealed Memorial in Response 
to the Edict,” there were sealed memorials submitted by other officials around the same time, such as Zhen Dexiu’s “Sealed Memorial in 
Response to the Edit [submitted in] the Second Month of the Year of Jiawu (1234),” Collected Works of Zhen Dexiu (Xishan Xiansheng 
Zhen Wenzhonggong Wenji) vol.13.
24. Jinshi means Presented Scholar conferred on successful candidates in the highest-level regular civil service recruitment examinations, 
qualifying them for appointment to government office (Hucker 1985). (translation note)
10
Shigeki HIRATA / UrbanScope Vol.6 (2015) 1-25
of Song and Yuan Confucians (Song Yuan xue’an) contains a chapter devoted to him and his disciples (“Heshan 
xuean”).25
The biography of Wei Liaoweng in the History of Song described his purpose in submitting the “Sealed Memo-
rial in Response to the Edict”:
Within a few months, all the neglected tasks were undertaken. [After Shi] Miyuan died, the emperor started to rule in-
dependently. He promoted [Wei Liaoweng] to the position of Edict Attendant of the Wenhua Hall [wenhua-ge daizhi], 
and awarded him the golden belt. Liaoweng worried that after consecutive autocratic grand councilors, who abused the 
political power of the state and changed the social ethos, the morality of the country had degenerated, and the laws and 
regulations had slackened; corrupt people served in the government and cheated in official business, making it difficult 
to purify [the state]. [Wei] therefore memorialized about ten issues in response to the edict, beseeching [the emperor] 
to promote new order by restoring traditions.
In short, Wei’s sealed memorial was a proposal of political reforms in the wake of the death of Shi Miyuan, the grand 
councilor who had long dominated politics, and at a time when Emperor Lizong set out to rule by himself.
According to the sealed memorial, Wei observed the general political evolution from the Northern Song to his 
own time as follows:
The rather urgent issues for the present are to recover the traditions built in the reigns of Emperor Taizu and Emperor 
Taizong [i.e. the first two emperors of the Song Dynasty]. The traditions were roughly changed during the years of 
Xining [1068–1077], only partly restored in the years of Yuanyou [1086–1094], and hugely destroyed from the years 
of Chongning [1102–1106] and Daguan [1107–1110] on. They were then resumed during the periods of Jianyan 
[1127–1130] and early Shaoxing [1131–1162], and gradually completed during the time of Qiandao [1165–1173], 
Chunxi [1174–1189], and Shaoxi [1190–1194]. These traditions, however, declined again from the years of Qingyuan 
[1195–1200], Jiatai [1201–1204], and Kaixi [1205–1207] on. Now Your Majesty is beginning to rule independently, 
and has called upon various worthies [to assist]. [It is the time for officials, up from] the Steward-bulwark of State and 
attendants down to administrators in various government offices, to embrace changes with open minds. [If we] miss 
this chance and do not restore the traditions, then [the traditions] will be alienated and forgotten as time goes by. When 
will there be another chance?
Wei Liaoweng indicates that the system designed by Emperor Taizu and Emperor Taizong was changed by Wang 
Anshi’s New Policies during the years of Xining. Although the system was later partly restored in the Yuanyou pe-
riod, it fell apart under the dominance of the new reformers during the years of Chongning and Daguan. Not until 
the early Southern Song (years of Jianyan and early Shaoxing) was it resumed. During Xiaozong’s reign (years of 
Qiandao, Chunxi, and Shaoxi), the system was gradually recovered, but again went through a major collapse dur-
ing the rule of the so-called autocratic grand councilors, such as Han Tuozhou and Shi Miyuan (during the years of 
Qingyuan, Jiatai, Kaixi, and thereafter). Throughout this long-term historical evolution, the political model of the 
Yuanyou period was Wei Liaoweng’s ideal. As he commented in the sealed memorial:
Your humble servant [Wei Liaoweng, thinks that] in the imperial dynasty there was no period more prosperous than 
the years of Yuanyou. Formerly, when Your Majesty ascended the throne, I had analyzed for you the magnificence of 
the personnel of the first year of Yuanyou: “At that time, the grand councilors included Sima Guang, Wen Yanbo, and 
Lü Gongzhu, and the vice grand councilors included Lü Dafang, Han Wei, Liu Zhi, and Fan Chunren. The censors 
and remonstrators included Su Zhe, Sun Kuan, Liang Tao, Fan Zuyu, Chuyu Shen, Zhu Guangting, Fu Yaoyu, and Lü 
Tao. The Hanlin Academician was Su Shi. The proclamation drafters included Fan Bailu, Zeng Zhao, Liu Ban, and Su 
25. To know more about Wei Liaoweng as a philosopher, see Hu, Liu, and Su (1997). As for Wei Liaoweng as a writer, see Zhang (2008).
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Zhe. The lecturers of the Classics Colloquium included Fu Yaoyu, Han Wei, Fan Zuyu, and Zhao Yanruo. The recita-
tion tutor was Cheng Yi. The first year [of Yuanyou] set the example [of personnel], and thus from the second year [of 
Yuanyou on], [the personnel arrangements during the Yuanyou period] were roughly the same. I do not [need to] name 
them all.” I explained like this, and Your Majesty commented in your august words: “Yuanyou talents were like this.” 
Your humble servant recalled memorializing in person: “This [Yuanyou model] should be followed today when ap-
pointing officials. It was because [the court used] Sima Guang as the grand councilor that talents like those mentioned 
above were invited and introduced. Regardless of others, [personnel arrangements] such as Su Shi in the Hanlin Acad-
emy and Cheng Yi at the Classics Colloquium should by no means be questioned.” Your Majesty nodded repeatedly.26
The following part of this article examines the content of each section of Wei’s sealed memorial.
To begin with, the first section “On restoring the tradition of the Three Departments to empower the Six Min-
isters” reads:
The imperial dynasty followed the Tang model and established the Three Departments: the Secretariat that received 
edicts [from the emperor], the Chancellery that reviewed [the received edicts], and the Department of State Affairs that 
implemented [the imperial orders]. All official documents forwarded from the emperor [to the Secretariat-Chancel-
lery], as well as memorials submitted [by officials] to the Secretariat-Chancellery from the four directions, were [pro-
cessed and then] sent to the Department of State Affairs. It then sent documents down to the Six Ministries that would 
further pass them down to various sections. Once the reports about relevant issues were ready, they were submitted 
to the Department of State Affairs, and then to the Secretariat, which would present them to the emperor and wait for 
imperial orders. When [the Secretariat] received the imperial orders, they again forwarded the orders to the Chancel-
lery for review. When the orders passed [the review], they were transcribed and sent to the Department of State Affairs, 
and then to the Six Ministries, for execution. This was roughly the mechanism of the Three Department system. Since 
people complained that [the process] was interminable, it was acceptable to combine the Secretariat and the Chancel-
lery into one, as happened from the Yuanyou period on. However, in the Xining period the grand councilor Wang Anshi 
particularly established the Secretariat Examiners to encroach on the power of the Three Departments’ officials. In the 
years of Yuanfeng, the Left and Right Offices replaced [the Secretariat Examiners]. Once these precedents were set, 
and the power resided in grand councilors, and the subordinates of the grand councilors became an arena where [grand 
councilors] seized and abused political power and authority.
Wei Liaoweng argues that official document processing was conventionally carried out by the Three Departments 
and Six Ministries. Nevertheless, the Secretariat Examiners who were directly affiliated with the grand councilors 
became the center of document processing during the period of Wang Anshi’s New Policies; so did the Left and 
Right Offices of the Department of State Affairs that were established during the years of Yuanfeng. Both of them 
undermined the power of the Six Ministries.  Kumamoto (1988, 1990, 2007) has shown that Wang Anshi and Em-
peror Shenzong (r. 1067–1085) attempted to use the subordinates of the grand councilors (zaiyuan), such as Secre-
tariat Examiners and the Left and Right Offices of the Department of State Affairs, to build a policy making system 
that was different from the conventional system of the Three Departments and Six Ministries, which had revolved 
around the emperor-grand councilors connections. It is therefore clear that the system of Three Departments and Six 
Ministries changed essentially after Wang Anshi’s New Policies reform.
The second section, “On restoring the tradition of the Two Administrations to collect ideas from the multitude 
[of officials],” says:
The imperial dynasty imitated the Tang model, assigning different responsibilities to the Three Department and the 
Bureau of Military Affairs, and having them memorialize in separate groups—only concerning major issues would 
26. Similar ideas can be seen frequently in The Complete Collected Works of Wei Liaoweng; for example, “On following the Yuanyou model 
and listening to public opinion when appointing officials” in vol. 16.
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they memorialize together. Therefore, there were the memorializing of the Secretariat-Chancellery, the memorializing 
of the Bureau of Military Affairs, the memorializing of the Three Departments, and the collective memorializing of the 
Three Departments and the Bureau of Military Affairs…In the restoration27 period, there were still five or six officials 
in the Three Departments. When Qin Gui dominated the politics, there was only one deputy serving in each of the Two 
Administrations [i.e. the Secretariat-Chancellery and the Bureau of Military Affairs]. In the early Qingyuan period, 
[the grand councilor] Han Tuozhou attempted to appoint himself concurrently as the Military Affairs Commissioner 
[i.e. the head of the Bureau]. Some told him that [this method] would not concentrate the power [in his hands], and 
that he would be better off giving up the title but assuming de-facto power, so that nothing would be excluded from 
[Han’s] rule. Later, the supervisor of the Public Pharmacy, Xia Yunzhong, catering to [Han’s] will, cited the precedents 
of Wang Dan, Lü Yijian, and Wen Yanbo, and proposed [to use the title of] the Manager of National Security Matters 
[pinzhang junguo-shi]. The vice grand councilors were all astounded and indignant, and this proposal was abolished. 
A few years later, it was eventually implemented, but then there were grand councilors and vice state councilors in 
the Two Administrations. From the years of Jiading on, grand councilors concurrently served as the Military Affairs 
Commissioners. [The Two Administrations] were then again combined into one.
We can see from this description that the form of imperial audiences changed from memorializing in separate groups 
(the Three Departments and the Bureau of Military Affairs reporting separately) to memorializing in a combined 
group. Moreover, the number of state councilors diminished, and in the Southern Song, sometimes grand councilors 
even served simultaneously as Military Affairs Commissioners.
In the first half of the Northern Song, imperial audiences took the form in which officials of the Secretariat-
Chancellery, the Bureau of Military Affairs, the Three Fiscal Agencies, Kaifeng Prefecture, and the Judicial Control 
Office took turns to memorialize the throne. The heads and vice-heads of the Secretariat-Chancellery and the Bu-
reau of Military Affairs were state councilors. Thus, by the reign of the third emperor of the Song, Emperor Zhen-
zong, ministers of the Secretariat-Chancellery and the Bureau of Military Affairs were memorializing in different 
groups. During the reign of Emperor Renzong, however, in order to cope with military affairs on the frontiers, the 
Two Administrations started to memorialize in a combined group. By the time of the Yuanfeng reforms of the bu-
reaucratic system, “memorializing in a combined group” had become the regular form of imperial audiences (Zhu 
1996: 134–138). Thereafter, the number of state councilors constantly declined. During the wars against the Jin28 
and Mongols in the Southern Song period, grand councilors even served as the Military Affairs Commissioners 
concurrently. Therefore, the practice of “memorializing in separate groups,” which could provide the emperor with 
differing opinions and intelligence, ceased to function.
The third section, “On restoring the tradition of the Executive Office to enhance the significance of the state 
councillorship,” observes:
In the prime of the imperial dynasty, the Department of State Affairs served as the outer department [waisheng] 
that received official documents from the four directions. The Executive Office was located within the imperial city 
[jinzhong], serving as the place for state councilors to get together. [State councilors] all gathered in the hall, sat to-
gether, and discussed all the opinions from governmental offices and the memorials turned in by the clerks of the vari-
ous administrations. A few quarters of an hour after the sunset, when the bell rang, [they] ate together, and thereafter 
went home in an orderly fashion. Nevertheless, during a hundred years, no residence was built [in the complex of the 
Executive Office], and [state councilors] lived close to commoners’ residence zones, which were usually far away from 
the imperial city. Therefore when state councilors left the imperial city [and went home], clerks had to take official 
documents and visit the various residences, which frequently resulted in delays or even the release [of confidential 
information]. Emperor Shenzong saw these problems and thus had [residences built] in the area southwest of the 
27. This refers to the restoration of the Song Dynasty in south China after the loss of northern China to the Jin Dynasty in 1126. (translation note)
28. The Jin Dynasty (1115–1234) was founded by the Wanyan clan of the Jurchen people. It overthrew the Khitan Liao dynasty in 1125. Soon 
after that, the Jin declared war against the Song Dynasty and conquered much of northern China. The Song was forced to flee south of 
Yangtze River. It eventually fell to the Mongols in 1234. (translation note)
13
Shigeki HIRATA / UrbanScope Vol.6 (2015) 1-25
[palace] gate. The residences were divided into the east and west parts, and each of the Two Administrations had four 
residences, in order to keep strictly the confidentiality of business [of each administration]. [The east and west parts], 
however, were adjacent to one another, enabling people in each part to hear conversations in the other part. Grand 
councilors who abused power to seek private gain found it inconvenient. Therefore, [autocratic grand councilors] pub-
licly [took official business] back to their private residences, ignoring their fellow [councilors]. This [phenomenon] 
has been passed down since Cai Jing.
Wei Liaoweng points out that state councilors originally discussed policies in the Executive Office located in the 
imperial city. However, since state councilors resided far away from the imperial city, they were unable to deal with 
emergencies once they left the imperial city. For this reason, during the reign of Emperor Shenzong, the court estab-
lished the East and West Offices, where state councilors met and exchanged ideas. Furthermore, after the time of the 
autocratic grand councilor, Cai Jing, the grand councilor’s residence endowed by the emperor became an important 
place for policy making. Thereafter, throughout the periods of Qin Gui, Han Tuozhou, and Shi Miyuan, autocratic 
grand councilors seldom went to the imperial city for business. By contrast, it became common practice for officials 
to bring relevant documents to visit a grand councilor in his place, or for visitors to wait in line outside the residence 
of the grand councilor. Kinugawa (1984) has attempted to explore the changes in autocratic grand councilors’ power 
through the examination of the distance between their residences and the imperial city. Indeed, the last autocratic 
grand councilor, Jia Sidao, was endowed with a house located in the Ge Ridge along the West Lake.29 Before him, 
Qin Gui, Han Tuozhou, and Shi Miyuan at best had been allowed to build their houses surrounding the Imperial An-
cestral Temple. The connections between power and the location of residence is a topic worthy of attention (Hirata 
2008).30
The fourth section, “On restoring the tradition of Attendants in order to acquire sincere advice,” comments:
In the imperial dynasty, attendants, ranging from the Grand Academician of the Guanwen Palace to the Academician 
Awaiting Instructions, have various responsibilities. Nevertheless, the essence of their duties is the same—to discuss 
thoughts and contribute. The Supervising Secretary and the Secretariat Drafter both remonstrate about [inappropriate] 
orders already issued. That censors and remonstrators are officials contributing suggestions goes without saying. Han-
lin Academicians and the heads and deputies of the Six Ministries, although not in the position specifically for making 
suggestions, should not withhold giving advice in special cases. Imperial edicts during the years of Xining criticized 
attendants for not speaking up. When Sima Guang rejected the position of vice Military Affairs Commissioner, he also 
observed that there was nothing attendants should not comment on. Therefore, important issues, such as appointing 
the imperial heir, rectifying the imperial inner quarters, debating the posthumous title of Prince Pu, debating the New 
Policies, flood prevention, and frontier defenses, were all decided after collective debates and discussion among at-
tendants. Even after crossing the river to the south [i.e. the establishment of the Southern Song], this political custom 
did not die down… After the second year of Qingyuan [1196, however,] the official morale suddenly declined, and [of-
ficials] gradually got used to keeping silence. When [Han] Tuozhou initiated the campaigns of military expansion, only 
Xu Bangxian, summoned back from Chu prefecture, strongly argued against it. “In the morning he memorialized, and 
in the evening he was cashiered.” A censor, Xu Nan, attacked him because of his comments. The Vice state councilor, 
Qian Xiangzu, was put to residence under surveillance in Xin prefecture. I witnessed all of these events personally. 
Although [I am] an insignificant figure, I also had some words [against Han’s scheme] prior to these two ministers [i.e. 
Xu Bangxian and Qian Xiangzu]. Alas, with regard to such a major issue of the country, nobody but these three people 
spoke up…Since the years of Jiading, although [the court] claimed to have a major reform, [the problem of] not paying 
attention to this [lack of dissident opinions] was even aggravated.  [It has been bad] to the extent that scholar-officials 
29. There was a lake to the west of Hangzhou. Ge Ridge was located on the north of the lake. (translation note)
30. Wei Liaoweng’s note to this section of his memorial pointed out that temples in front of residences of autocratic grand councilors became 
places for officials to wait to visit the grand councilors, and thus served as places for bribery. Moreover, in the period when Shi Miyuan 
dominated politics, the Monastery of Great Kindness (daci-si) in Ming Prefecture, which was built to make sacrifices to Shi’s mother, 
became a place for Shi to make money.
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mock and insult [attendants by saying that] the attendants have no ideas to discuss but do have contributions. When 
they say “have contributions,” they satirically refer to bribery.
In the second volume of Assorted Important Issues of the Government and Society (Chaoye leiyao), the author 
defines the attendants as “the Hanlin Academicians, the Supervising Secretary, the Six Ministers, and the Eight 
Vice Directors. In addition, the Secretariat Drafter, the Left and Right Scribes are called junior attendants.” The 
range of “the attendants” was fairly wide, but the most important were the Hanlin Academicians, the Supervising 
Secretary, and the Secretariat Drafter, who were responsible for drafting and reviewing imperial edicts. According 
to Wei’s memorial, obliged to “discuss thoughts and contribute ideas,” attendants worked with speaking officials31 
in advising the emperor. The issues they addressed included “appointing the imperial heir” (deciding the crown 
prince during Emperor Renzong’s reign), “rectifying the imperial inner quarters” (dealing with women in politics 
during Emperor Renzong’s reign), “debating the posthumous title of Prince Pu” (debates concerning the posthumous 
honorific title of Emperor Yingzong’s biological father during Emperor Yingzong’s reign), “debating New Policies, 
flood prevention, and frontier defenses” (during Emperor Shenzong’s reign), the rites of hosting the Jurchen envoy 
during the Shaoxing peace negotiations with the Jin Dynasty, Emperor Xiaozong’s favoritism for Long Dayuan 
during the years of Shaoxing and Qiandao, the issues of Zeng Di, and Zhang Yue’s appointment during the years of 
Qiandao. Many officials were at first able to express different opinions. When Han Tuozhou seized power, however, 
he took the repression of Zhu Xi’s teaching in the second year of Qingyuan as an opportunity to shut down free 
expressions of ideas. Therefore, on the eve of the military campaigns against the Jurchen Jin during the Kaixi period 
(1205–1207), Wei Liaoweng was one among the only three dissenters. Therefore, by the time of Emperor Lizong’s 
reign, people all criticized the attendants for merely “contributing” (referring to bribing) while not “discussing their 
thoughts” (referring to remonstrating). In other words, Wei Liaoweng argued that the dominance of autocratic grand 
councilors, such as Han Tuozhou and Shi Miyuan, almost put a halt to the attendants’ function of “discussing their 
thoughts and contributing ideas.”
The fifth section, “On recovering the tradition of the Classics Colloquium to promote the teachings of the sage,” 
reads: 
The tradition of the Classics Colloquium, although started in the beginning of the imperial dynasty, developed over 
time, and became fully established in the middle of the dynasty. Prominent people involved included Yan Shu, Fu Bi, 
Sun Shi, Fan Zhen, Li Shi, Song Qi, Ouyang Xiu, Sima Guang, Lü Gongzhu, Liu Chang, Su Shi, and so forth. Such 
people need no superfluous praise, nor can they all be fully listed [here]. In addition, there were reputable Confucians 
who were reclusive and in low positions. They were invited to become lecturers, disregarding their bureaucratic ranks. 
Not worried that they were hard to invite, [the court] used great courtesy to encourage them to come…Nevertheless, 
when sometimes the emperor did not take care of state affairs personally, grand councilors appointed people they al-
ways favored and trusted to the positions. Perhaps they were concerned that lecturers would cite traditions to criticize 
contemporary politics; [after all,] when a ruler knows more about classics and histories, he will distance himself from 
petty persons. This scheme was perhaps similar to that which [the Tang eunuch] Qiu Shiliang used to consolidate the 
imperial favor. [I cannot imagine] how those who were not devoted to studies could work in such positions [i.e. as 
lecturers]…Now that [those unqualified people] have taken the positions that were meant for [talented] people, such 
as [Yan] Shu, [Fu] Bi, [Ouyang] Xiu, [Sima] Guang, [Cheng] Yi, [Yin] Tun, [Zhi] Xi, and [Zhang] Shi, we can easily 
know that they must constantly fritter away time and simply use mere formality to waste the emperor’s efforts to learn 
from the lectures.
31. “Speaking officials” was a generic reference to Grand Masters of Remonstrance (jianyi dafu), Supervising Secretaries (jishizhong), and 
others whose principal and characteristic function was to monitor the making of policy decisions at court and to recommend or criticize 
policies (Hucker 1985). (translation note)
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This section points out that from the Northern Song to the Southern Song, lecturers of the Classics Colloquium 
included not only officials of high status and prestige but also recluses or people of relatively low status. From 
Emperor Lizong’s reign on, the court often appointed unqualified people to be the lecturers for the Classics Collo-
quium. The part after “nevertheless” is particularly noteworthy. It says that when the emperor was not dedicated to 
governmental affairs, grand councilors would appoint their own subordinates to be the lecturers, because they feared 
people would criticize current politics. We can compare this part with the record of “exhorters holding concurrent 
position as lecturers” (zhengyan jian dushu) in the first volume of Lü Zhong’s Major Events of the Restored Imperial 
Dynasty (Huangchao Zhongxing Dashiji):
The places for a ruler’s activities are no more than the inner court, the outer court, and the Classics Colloquium. [Grand 
councilor Qin] Gui colluded with the eunuch physician, Wang Jixian, to secretly detect the emperor’s intentions. [He] 
also put his people in the positions of vice state councilors, censors, and remonstrators, so that they would cover up 
mistakes for him in the outer court. The Classics Colloquia were the only occasions where the ruler interacted closely 
with Confucians. [Qin Gui] was afraid that [the lecturers] would say something [to his disadvantage] during the collo-
quia. Therefore, [Qin] assigned those who were appointed censors and remonstrators to [positions] related to the Clas-
sical Colloquium as well, so that he could know the emperor’s activities and the contents of the lecturers’ speeches. 
[Qin Gui] even appointed his son Qin Xi the concurrent Reader-in-Waiting, merely to plan for his private gain.
According to the text, the Southern Song autocratic grand councilor Qin Gui placed his subordinates in important 
positions in the outer court, while colluding with the eunuch physician Wang Jixian to detect political information 
in the inner court. Moreover, he appointed his son a lecturer for the Classics Colloquium and a remonstrator. By 
so doing, Qin Gui completely controlled the three spaces of the emperor’s political activities. In his discussion of 
the lecturers of the Classics Colloquium, Wei cited Qiu Shiliang’s scheme to consolidate imperial favor. The record 
of the Tang eunuch Qiu Shiliang’s “Strategies to consolidate power and imperial favor” records the following (in 
Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance [Zizhi Tongjian], vol. 247, item about the fifth month of the third year 
of Huichang during Emperor Wuzong’s reign [843 AD]):
On the day of Guiyou,32 Qiu Shiliang retired from palace domestic service with the title Left-guard Generalissimo. His 
partisans accompanied him back to his private residence. Shiliang taught them the techniques of consolidating imperial 
favor: “The Son of Heaven [i.e. the emperor] should not be left unoccupied. [You] should always entertain him with 
extravagant things, renewing them every day and upgrading them every month, [so that the emperor] will have no 
time for other affairs. Thereafter, we can realize our ambitions. Make sure you don’t let him read books or get close to 
Confucians. [If] he sees the rise and fall of previous dynasties and knows to worry, we will be ousted.” His partisans 
thanked him and then left.
Qiu’s strategies were to constantly provide the emperor with new forms of entertainment, to distract him from con-
sidering governmental affairs, and to keep him from reading and getting close to Confucian scholars. Wei Liaoweng 
probably believed that Han Tuozhou and Shi Miyuan were practicing Qiu’s strategies to consolidate power and 
imperial favor.
The sixth section, “On restoring the tradition of censors and remonstrators to ensure of the fairness of promo-
tions and demotions,” reads:
[According to] the tradition of censors and remonstrators of the imperial dynasty, [a censor and a remonstrator] or-
dinarily did not see one another, nor did they exchange thoughts before making comments on governmental affairs. 
Even to their superiors, they did not need to report [before making comments]. Therefore, it happened from time to 
time that when censors commented, remonstrators disagreed, and that when remonstrators commented, censors were 
32. Guiyou is the tenth part of the Chinese sexagenary cycle, the traditional way to date the passage of time. (translation note)
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dismissed because they had not spoken up. Even during the years of Jingkang [1126–1127], the conflict between Li 
Guang and Feng Xie still embodied this idea. From the restoration on, although where censors and remonstrators 
lived was separated into six residences, they shared one gate, and [people] were able to visit one another on the other 
side of the wall. This greatly contravened the tradition. The reason why censors and remonstrators in previous reigns 
were never allowed to interact with one another was perhaps to have them fully express their own opinions without 
considering the opinions of one another. When Qin Gui dominated the court, he appointed censors and remonstrators 
all through secret letters, and told them to attack vice state councilors in order to replace them with his people. [They] 
were generally called censor-and-remonstrators [taijian], with no differences in duties. They therefore publicly formed 
cliques, and people did not take it as problematic…[Han] Tuozhou followed Qin [Gui]’s suit. When the late emperor 
first ascended the throne, Wu Lie and Liu Dexiu were both appointed to work in the censorate. One was virtuous, the 
other evil [literally, one was fragrant and the other foul smelling], so when the command [appointing them] came out 
people realized that the political situation was different [from earlier]. In addition, Han [Tuozhou], who grew more 
and more powerful every day, backed up [Liu] Dexiu. At the same time, good and honest people were all attacked. 
Thereafter, [autocratic grand councilors] all appointed their own people as censors and remonstrators. Sometimes 
[grand councilors] clearly expressed their intentions, and sometimes [censor-and-remonstrators] catered to the wills of 
[grand councilors]. They dismissed and suppressed public opinion, and the order of the imperial court fell in turmoil…
Thereafter, all newly appointed censor-and-remonstrators applied in advance to meet [the grand councilors], treating 
them with wines and dishes. When [they planned to] make comments on issues, [censor-and-remonstrators and grand 
councilors] would interact through correspondence. To begin with, [censor-and-remonstrators] would submit complete 
drafts. If [autocratic grand councilors] agreed, they would allow the comments to be made; otherwise the drafts would 
be replaced. Because replacement was performed, most of the time it took until the end of the month to decide the 
ranks of office or dates [of appointment]. People who heard of it did not take it as problematic, and those who com-
mented on it did not take it as shameful. Thenceforth, censor-and-remonstrators [always] told others that comments 
they recently made were all assigned [to them] from the residences of [autocratic grand councilors]. I doubted it, [but] 
the other day Li Zhixiao told me that regarding the recent remarks about Hong Zikui and Hu Mengyu, the entire text 
came from the residence of the grand councilor. If what they said is true, then the [problems] have become even worse 
than sending drafts for review. Therefore people observe that censor-and-remonstrators are no better than the creatures 
[of autocratic grand councilors].
We can see from the description that originally censors and remonstrators did not exchange words. They each 
worked separately on making critiques. In the Southern Song, however, the offices of the two merged, and these 
two groups of officials interacted with one another. Furthermore, during Qin Gui’s dominance of politics, he con-
trolled the appointments of censor-and-remonstrators through “secret letters” and told them to impeach vice state 
councilors who opposed him. This situation continued in the periods of autocratic grand councilors such as Han 
Tuozhou and Shi Miyuan. Not only were censors and remonstrators all subservient to the grand councilors, but 
their official documents were processed in and sent out from the residences of the autocratic grand councilors. Cen-
sors and remonstrators had degenerated to be no more than the creatures of the autocratic grand councilors.33 In a 
previous article, I argued that originally a personnel principle stipulated that relatives of state councilors and those 
recommended by grand councilors should not be appointed censors or remonstrators. The principle was designed to 
ensure the independence of censors and remonstrators from the executive government led by state councilors, and 
to enable them to speak against it. This principle, however, gradually decayed during Wang Anshi’s councillorship. 
Personnel connections between state councilors and censor-and-remonstrators became stronger and stronger (Hirata 
1992). Wei Liaoweng’s description shows that these kinds of connections intensified in the periods of Southern 
Song autocratic grand councilors: the processing of official documents by censor-and-remonstrates were even more 
closely connected to the grand councilors’ offices or residences.
The seventh section, “On restoring the tradition of making proclamations to ensure the prudence of orders,” observes:
33. There have been a number of studies on the speaking officials in the Southern Song. The most representative one is Liu (1987).
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The imperial dynasty followed previous dynasties in selecting personnel to [serve as] proclamation drafters. There 
were a variety of titles of [proclamation drafters], which cannot be completely listed [here]. Generally speaking, when 
there were grand proclamations and diplomatic proclamations, inner drafters were allowed to turn in drafts of procla-
mations [for review]…With regard to appointment proclamations, [the inner drafters] were summoned to be informed 
of [the appointments] in person, and to contribute their thoughts [about the appointment] properly. [Through] the 
discussions between the emperor and inner drafters, adjustments were promptly made, in accord with traditional [prac-
tice]. When the emperor went out, [drafters] accompanied him, standing by for consultation. If [drafters] requested to 
have audiences, there were no intervals during their audiences. When memorializing, they used the bangzi [format]; 
when reporting to the Three Departments and Bureau of Military Affairs, they collectively used the zibao [format], 
without signing names. Therefore, those who were called the inner grand councilors were able to discuss with the em-
perors history and current issues, and to give advice on issuing edicts. This is how significant they were…Outer draft-
ers were assigned to deal with the matters of the Six Offices respectively. They implemented imperial orders, drafting 
proclamations in the relevant offices. Whenever there was anything inappropriate [in the imperial orders], they were 
able to take issue and remonstrate. Every morning, they visited the Secretariat, and drafted proclamations in the Ziwei 
Hall. Only when state councilors had left the office were they excused from duty…Traditionally, no officials started 
working before receiving their appointment proclamations. Even the proclamations for endowing posthumous titles 
were not delayed even for one day. Since the restoration, there have been many unseen troubles, and some officials 
started to take up office before receiving their appointment proclamations. [Behaviors like this] continued for a long 
time and gradually became a custom, which undermined the original meaning of appointing officials. In these forty 
years, things have changed day by day. The most important [changes] began with the dysfunction of the inner drafters 
and was followed by the dysfunction of the outer drafters. Both groups were constrained by the autocratic ministers, 
unable to exert their influence…Recently, the condition is even more different from [what it was] previously. [With 
regard to the inner drafters,] usually each of the two academicians [i.e. drafters] composed one draft, and the grand 
councilors sometimes revised them, taking one of them as the original imperial order and the other as the proclama-
tion in response to the order. This way of working continued for so long that people did not regard it as strange. This 
is [what I call] the dysfunction of inner drafters. Those serving as the outer drafters, once they received the notices of 
appointment, immediately planned to cheat. [The delays] that I saw in the years of Jiatai and Kaixi were still limited 
to only five or ten days. In recent years, however, the delay [of appointment proclamations] has been rather extreme. 
Those serving close [to the capital] only receive their appointment proclamations half a month or ten days after their 
arrivals [at the new positions]. Those commissioners and military commanders who served outside [the capital] for 
were dubbed “newly appointed” even after a year of work in their positions, [because their appointment proclamations 
were so delayed].
Imperial proclamation documents were comprised of inner proclamations (neizhi) and outer proclamations (waizhi). 
Hanlin Academicians were responsible for drafting inner proclamations, which included: 1) appointment proclama-
tions (ceshu) of empresses, imperial concubines, and the heads of the Three Department military affairs; 2) proc-
lamations (zhishu) regarding important military and political affairs, or for the appointments of Vice Directors and 
Military Commissioners; 3) imperial edicts (zhaoshu) appointing Edict Attendants and Surveillance Commission-
ers; and 4) imperial essays (yuzha) used in imperial ancestral sacrifices and for important orders. Hanlin Academi-
cians were directly responsible to the emperor. They used special official documents for memorializing—bangzi to 
the emperor, and zibao to the Three Departments and the Bureau of Military Affairs. They were sometimes called 
Inner Grand Councilors (neixiang) and thus their positions were extremely prestigious. When it came to the appoint-
ments of grand councilors or significant state affairs, the emperor would summon Hanlin Academicians on duty to 
the small palace near East Palace Gate at night and gave orders to them in person. Academicians would then return to 
the Hanlin Academy to draft the proclamations and submit them to the inner court. On the other hand, drafters in the 
Secretariat were responsible for the outer proclamations that covered all imperial orders other than those conveyed 
through inner proclamations. These documents were then turned in to the grand councilors (Yamamoto 1968: chap. 
10). Besides drafting imperial proclamations upon the orders of grand councilors, drafters in the Secretariat had the 
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right to “seal and return the notes of orders” (fenghuan citou), that is, to refuse to draft certain proclamations. This 
was the original form of producing proclamations. During the Southern Song, however, various problems appeared: 
appointments were announced even before these two drafting groups composed the proclamations; distinctions be-
tween the two drafting groups disappeared; official documents produced by the two drafting groups were influenced 
by autocratic grand councilors; and official proclamations were not issued. Related to this situation, in the Southern 
Song, it became normal for officials to serve concurrently as Hanlin Academicians, Auxiliary Drafters or in other 
positions. Moreover, the set number of drafting officials was reduced and the offices were often understaffed. As 
a result, during the autocracy of Qin Gui, the principles of “remonstration” (fengbo) and “sealing and retuning the 
notes of orders,” which expressed dissenting opinions to the executive government, indeed stopped functioning.34
The eighth section, “On restoring the tradition of listening to ideas to enable the transmission of information 
upward from below,” comments:
In the flourishing era of the reigns of Emperor Taizu and Taizong, the emperors held audiences to make decisions 
sometimes until noon. In cases where the memorializing in a certain audience lasted so long that the rest of the audi-
ence groups could not be all received, the emperors would order palace Provisioners [taiguan] to serve food in the 
palace. Sometimes, when the ministers had not withdrawn, food was also served at the palace gate. After eating, the 
emperors would sit [in the palace] again to receive the rest of the audience groups. In the early years of Emperor 
Renzong’s reign, as many as nineteen groups of officials were presented for audiences. After that, memorializing in 
the inner palace never exceeded five groups. An imperial edict stipulated that before the hours of dragon [7 to 9 a.m.], 
one audience should be regularly saved for censors and remonstrators who had petitioned for audiences. This regula-
tion was continually used, passed on from one reign to the next…When Qin [Gui] and Han [Tuozhou] wielded state 
power, they treated the august spirit [of the imperial dynasty] as stuff in their own cases, which they possessed and 
controlled. They only worried about people who might have [dissenting] words. [Therefore,] although two audience 
groups were presented every day, they were frequently interrupted. [To make it worse,] when those audiences started 
every morning, it was already the beginning of the hours of dragon [around 7 a.m.]. Those so-called attendants never 
had the chance to accompany the emperor at mealtimes, contributing ideas at leisure. If they wanted to express their 
opinions, [they had to] apply to the Office for Audience Ceremonies. Even the lecturers of the Classics Colloquium 
would be asked before [the colloquia] whether they would memorialize or not. The Two Scribes, although allowed to 
serve on duty [close to the emperor], had also to apply to the Office for Audience Ceremonies before they could have 
audiences. Those among the two memorializing groups were merely satisfied with formality, hoping to avoid [trouble]. 
Sometimes, when it came to some officials’ turn to participate in the audience rotations, [they refused to attend,] with 
the excuses of either promotion or illness. It is said that moral cultivation and lecturing are of the essence in how 
ministers have assisted rulers since ancient times. Currently, [officials] tell each other that merely speaking of moral 
cultivation and lecturing, one can still be called upright while not actually criticizing current politics; merely criticiz-
ing the emperor personally, one can thus demonstrate to others his integrity while indeed not antagonizing the current 
grand councilors. Alas, official morality has degenerated to this extent.
The text mentions that, in the dynasty’s most thriving period, the imperial audiences lasted until the hours of horse 
(i.e. 11 a.m. to 1 p.m.). In the early years of Emperor Renzong’s reign, as many as nineteen audiences were held. 
During this period, the emperor received five memorializing groups at the front palace and ensured that censors and 
remonstrators had one audience before the hours of dragon, which became a rule.35 During the autocracy of Qin Gui 
and Han Tuozhou, however, the number of audiences remained only two. Meanwhile, the time of audiences was lim-
ited to before seven in the morning, and audiences were frequently postponed until the next day. Moreover, officials 
such as the attendants, lecturers of the Classics Colloquium and the Two Scribes, who had originally enjoyed priority 
34. See “On reappointing supervising secretaries and secretariat drafters,” Major Events of the Restored Imperial Dynasty (Huangchao 
Zhongxing Dashiji), vol. 1.
35. Concerning the issue of “five memorializing groups” during Emperor Renzong’s reign, see Hirata (2012b).
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in audiences, now needed to apply to the Office for Audience Ceremonies36 if they wanted to meet the emperor for 
audiences. Furthermore, officials slated for “rotating audiences” often declined the audiences on the pretext of pro-
motions or illness.37 This was due to the political atmosphere, in which people avoided antagonizing the autocratic 
grand councilors. The latter half of this section discusses “imperial students’ demonstrations at the palace gate” and 
the issue of “the Public Petitioners Drum Office.” The court did not accept the students’ petitions and even exiled 
them in punishment. Petitions put into the mailbox set up in “the Public Petitioners Drum Office” were censored, 
and the office only took cases that contained no criticism of the government.38
Although this text mainly described the situation under the dominance of Qin Gui, we can see similar descrip-
tions in other sources.39 Officials who had the opportunities for “sequential audiences” tended to avoid attending the 
audiences on the pretext of disease, while the “sequential audiences” for the officials of the Court of Judicial Review 
slightly increased. The main reason was that Qin Gui hated to see other people express their opinions to the emperor. 
It is therefore evident that under the rule of autocratic grand councilors, the opportunities for audiences diminished 
and officials were subject to strict supervision.
The ninth section “On restoring the tradition of the Three Commands to strengthen the imperial dynasty,” says:
With regard to the tradition of Three Commands of the imperial dynasty, when Emperor Taizu started this dynasty, 
learning from [the problems] of previous dynasties, [he] selected trustworthy officials to take charge of the imperial 
armies, numbering some hundred thousand [soldiers]. This was a significant means to strengthen the central forces 
while weakening the local ones, to guard the imperial household, and to defend the imperial capital. From the mid-
Northern Song on, [the imperial armies] gradually became arrogant and lazy, and this situation was exacerbated during 
the years of Chongning and Daguan. When Gao Qiu was blessed with imperial favor and used [to administer the impe-
rial armies], the discipline slackened, and only thirty thousand soldiers remained. Perhaps the disaster of Jingkang,40 
the weakening of the imperial capital, and the invasions of the barbarians resulted from this. From the restoration 
on, [the new court] first learned the lessons drawn from the previous failures. [The court] not only recruited soldiers 
strictly but also had them intensely trained. Even during difficult times with various troubles, even people as arrogant 
and stubborn as Xin Qizong and Wang Yuanzhi did not undermine the laws and regulations…Generally speaking, 
those appointed from the years of Qingyuan all focused on repaying private debts of gratitude and strengthening [their 
own] power. Those appointed from the years of Jiading on were all simply used to serve [the autocratic grand council-
ors] and to invite bribery for them. [These changes in the imperial armies] lost Emperor Taizu and Emperor Taizong’s 
intention to reside in a strengthened center and control weakened local forces.
According to the text, the number of soldiers in the Three Commands, which were the backbone of the imperial 
armies, declined from a hundred thousand to thirty thousand. Meanwhile, the army discipline slackened. This led to 
the Jingkang Incident. Learning a lesson from the fall of the Northern Song, the early Southern Song court recruited 
soldiers carefully and implemented severe punishments to enforce military discipline. During the autocracy of Han 
Tuozhou, however, appointments to the armies started to serve as a means to repay debts of gratitude or for aggran-
dizing power. When Shi Miyuan seized power, the armies were used for personal purposes of the grand councilor, 
36. In the Southern Song, officials of the Office for Audience Ceremonies played a remarkable part in the documental transmission between the 
emperors and officials. See Fujimoto (2004).
37. Wei Liaoweng pointed out similar problems in his memorial “On duty regarding six unexplained issues and two theories of the villain and 
the righteous,” submitted in the fourth month of the first year of Baoqing (1225) when Emperor Lizong ascended the throne. This memorial 
revealed the situations of imperial audiences between the last years of Emperor Ningzong’s reign and the early stage of Emperor Lizong’s 
reign.
38. The attached note indicated the problems of “collective discussion (jiyi)”: this occasion was no longer where officials exchange and discuss 
their ideas, but where they accepted decisions of autocratic grand councilors.
39. See Major Events of the Restored Imperial Dynasty (Huangchao Zhongxing Dashiji), vol. 2, “resuming officials’ rotated audiences.”
40. This disaster refers to the Jingkang Incident, or the Humiliation of Jingkang. It took place in 1127 during the Jin-Song wars, when the 
invading Jurchen soldiers of the Jin Dynasty besieged and sacked the Song capital, Kaifeng. The Jin forces abducted Emperor Qinzong, his 
father Emperor Emeritus Huizong, along with many members of the imperial court. It marked the end of the Northern Song. (translation 
note)
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and corruption was rampant.41
The tenth section, “On restoring the tradition of Military Commissioners to eliminate private purposes,” ob-
serves:
In the beginning of the imperial dynasty, [the court] first eliminated the problems passed down from the late Tang and 
Five Dynasties.42 It replaced military commissioners with prefects and replaced wars with studies of the classics. With-
in a hundred years, although there were occasional threats on the frontiers, there were never domestic riots. Therefore, 
although the power of the dynasty was weak, peoples’ support for the state did not diminish. That was because Emper-
ors Taizu and Taizong set up guides and principles and cultivated ethics, so that the foundation [of state power] was 
rectified and the origin of [state power] was purified from above; former worthies and upright ministers distinguished 
the virtuous from the villainous and illuminated [the distinction] between righteousness and profit, so that the rules 
were engrained and discipline was manifested down below. [The court] did not overly amass wealth to undermine the 
foundation; neither did it abuse military power to invite barbarian viciousness.  The ruling model of the dynasty was 
like this. Although it appeared to be weak, the foundation of the state was strong. Nevertheless, autocratic ministers 
seized any possible chances, using either peace or war as their strategies for power consolidation. When Wang Anshi 
seized power, he first assigned himself the tasks of enriching the state and strengthening its military power. Thereafter, 
he set up a special account book [pangtong-bu] to please the emperor, depriving the Three Fiscal Agencies of their 
power and concentrating it in the hands of the court. Once the state treasury was filled, [he] sent his vicious partisans 
to fight north and west. They exhausted [the army’s] manpower and wasted money to secure useless places. They exag-
geratedly reported victory but covered up defeat to deceive the ruler. Eventually the loss of the armies and the collapse 
of discipline threatened and alarmed the imperial house.
In this text, regarding the issue of frontier defense centered on Military Commissioners, Wei Liaoweng argues 
for the consolidation of the essence of the state. The proposed essence was embodied in “setting up guides and 
principles,” “cultivating ethics,” “distinguishing worthies from villains,” and “illuminating the distinction between 
righteousness and profit.” This essence would lead the state to the “rule through culture,” which emphasized moral-
ity and spirit, and thus distinguished itself from Wang Anshi’s policies for “enriching the state and increasing its 
military power.” Autocratic grand councilors seized any possible opportunity, calling for either peace or war in order 
to consolidate their power. Qin Gui and Shi Miyuan represented those who argued for peace, and Han Tuozhou was 
among those supporting wars; in a section omitted here, Wei discusses their methods. Though not discussed in detail 
here, in a memorial entitled “Memorializing at a special audience in the seventh month of the year of Yiwei [1235]” 
(yiwei qiu qiyue teban zoushi) in the Complete Collected Works of Wei Liaoweng, Wei also points out that Military 
Commanderies were not staffed with experienced officials, and that as the power of Military Commissioners was 
reduced, it became concentrated on the hands of a few Military Commanders.
At the end of the memorial, Wei Liaoweng explained his purpose in proposing these ten pieces of advice. The 
most essential part of the section is as follows:
From the spring of the eighth year of Yuanfeng to the summer of the ninth year of Yuanyou, when the reign title was 
changed in to Shaosheng, Emperor Zhezong waited quietly for ten years before he ruled independently. The excellence 
of the personnel arrangements in the early Yuanyou period was indeed brought about by the Empress Dowager Xuan-
ren. After the change of reign title, it was nevertheless not as good as before. At his time Fan Zuyu once commented: 
“Now this time of independent rule is a period when the root of the rise or fall of the Song Dynasty will be planted, 
41. According to Wei Liaoweng’s fifth memorial “Of the audiences upon the appointment of Minister of Rites” (The Complete Collected Works 
of Wei Liaoweng, vol. 19), while the numbers of soldiers of the Three Commands declined, armies were continuously sent from the capital 
to the frontiers, which resulted in the ineffective defense in the capital.
42. Five Dynasties (907–960) was an era of political disunity in China between the fall of the Tang Dynasty and the founding of the Song. During 
this period, five dynasties quickly succeeded one another in the north, and more than ten independent states were established, mainly in the 
south. (translation note)
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and when the foundation of the stability or instability of the country will be built. It is the beginning of people’s joys or 
sorrows. It is a critical point for inviting or alienating worthies, and for the growth or decline of villains. It is a decisive 
time for losing or strengthening the mandate of heaven and people’s support.”
It is clear that Wei Liaoweng consistently believed that the political model of the Yuanyou Era was the most ideal 
one. When Emperor Zhezong took over and ruled independently, however, he restored the model of Emperor Shen-
zong’s reign. As a result, everything under the Yuanyou model vanished like a burst bubble. Wei Liaoweng intended 
to make an analogy between the independent government of Emperor Lizong and that of Emperor Zhezong. He also 
cited Fan Zuyu’s remonstrations to Emperor Zhezong at the beginning of his independent rule as a way to express 
his own views. Probably Wei hoped that emperor Lizong would see the analogy between the historical political situ-
ation and the period of Shi Miyuan’s autocracy that he had personally experienced, and, as he began his own period 
of independent rule, would return to pursuing the correct direction.
According to the biography of Wei Liaoweng in Volume 437 of the History of Song, “the Emperor was touched 
when he read [the “Sealed Memorial in Response to the Edict”]. He immediately promoted it and was able to recite it 
in the Classics Colloquium. Thereafter, all the traditions were restored.” Nevertheless, it seems Wei’s proposals were 
actually not put into practice. The biography continues: “[Wei] retuned to the court for six months and submitted more 
than twenty memorials, all concerning urgent issues of the day. The emperor was about to bring him to join the council-
lorship, but those jealous of Wei conspired to elbow him out, so that his position at court was insecure. State councilors 
then observed that Wei was the only important official who also knew military affairs and understood the situation of 
the country. Therefore, Wei was appointed Inspector of the Armies of Jinghu [Jinghu was comprised of the circuits of 
Jingxi, Hubei, and Hunan], concurrently holding the titles of Academician of the Duanming Palace and co-notary of 
the Bureau of Military Affairs. Meanwhile, when the Military Commander of Jianghuai, Zeng Conglong, died due to 
anxiety, the Jianghuai region was also entrusted to Liaoweng.” This shows that after his return to the court, Wei repeat-
edly memorialized. But because of the antagonism from other court officials, Wei’s suggestions were not implemented, 
and he himself was appointed to positions outside the capital.43
In terms of its effectiveness, the importance of the “Sealed Memorial in Response to the Edict” should not be 
overestimated. Moreover, the wars against the Tangut Xixia, the Jurchen Jin, and the Mongols were tremendously im-
portant issues in the Southern Song. The “Sealed Memorial in Response to the Edict,” however, did not address them. 
Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that before the memorial was submitted in the first year of the Duanping era 
(1234), the Xixia had been eradicated by the Mongols, and Jin was also destroyed by the allied armies of the Mongols 
and the Southern Song. The Southern Song therefore was able to take a short break from defense issues. Indeed, Wei’s 
collected works preserves memorials that convey his opinions concerning military campaigns against the Jin, the Xixia, 
and the Mongols, such as “On selecting people to lead the garrison in four strategic sites in preparation for the Jin and 
Xia barbarians”; “On reclaiming farmland on Sichuan borderland” (the fifteenth year of Jiading [1222], The Complete 
Collected Works of Wei Liaoweng, vol. 16); the fourth and fifth memorials “Regarding the audiences upon the ap-
pointment of Minister of Rites ” (the tenth month of the first year of Duanping, vol. 19); “Memorializing at a special 
audience in the seventh month of the year of Yiwei” (the seventh month of the second year of Duanping [1235], vol. 
20); “On the three rivers and eight dams in Jiangling Prefecture” (the first month of the third year of Duanping [1236], 
vol.28); “On missed timing due to the discord of two grand councilors when outside enemies have not been quelled” 
(the second month of the third year of Duanping, vol. 29); and “Remonstration on the ten issues regarding envoys re-
porting on completion of mission” (the fifth month of the third year of Duanping, vol. 30).
Regarding the timing of the submission of the “Sealed Memorial in Response to the Edict,” it was before the so-
called “entering Luoyang in the year of Duanping,” the military campaign to recover the land in north China under-
43. In his memorials, such as, the second memorial “Regarding the audiences upon the appointment of Minister of Rites” (The Complete 
Collected Works of Wei Liaoweng, vol. 19), and “Petition on the repeal of the Imperial Brush protecting Shi Miyuan”(vol. 20), and “The 
first memorial on allowing Zhao Ruyu to enjoy sacrifices with Emperor Ningzong” (vol. 20), Wei Liaoweng constantly discussed some 
problems in the early years of Emperor Lizong’s independent rule, including the conflicts between two political groups led by the two grand 
councilors, Qiao Xingjian and Zheng Qingzhi, respectively; and the remaining power of the autocratic grand councilor Shi Miyuan.
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taken during the fifth and eighth months of the first year of Duanping. In addition, Zhen Dexiu’s “Sealed memorial 
in response to edicts in the second month of the year of Jiawu” (Collected Works of Zhen Dexiu [Xishan Xiansheng 
Zhen Wenzhong Gong Wenji], vol. 13) came out almost at the same time. The “second month” in this title indicates 
that Wei Liaoweng’s memorial may also have been presented in the second or third month.
Wei’s “Sealed Memorial in Response to the Edict” proposed to reform domestic politics on the Yuanyou model 
at a time when wars against external enemies were temporarily halted and Emperor Lizong started his independent 
rule upon the death of Shi Miyuan. This memorial contains proposals presented from the aspect of domestic politics 
and thus is a useful source for examining the political changes between the Northern Song and the Southern Song. 
Moreover, the fact that Wei’s sealed memorial was often cited in Lü Zhong’s Major Events of the Restored Imperial 
Dynasty indicates that the Southern Song people saw Wei’s depictions of the historical changes as reliable.
IV. Conclusion
Finally, I would like to make a brief conclusion. The content of the “Sealed Memorial in Response to the 
Edict” can be summarized as follows: Wei Liaoweng singled out a major transitional period ranging from the New 
Policy reforms during the Xining and Yuanfeng years of the Northern Song to the era of autocratic grand councilors 
Qin Gui, Han Tuozhou, and Shi Miyuan in the Southern Song. He delineated the process by which power became 
concentrated in certain state councilors or in specific institutions connected to state councilors; accordingly, the of-
fices of attendants and censors and remonstrators, the Classics Colloquium, the proclamation drafting office, and 
the institution of imperial audiences functioned poorly. The system that connected the emperor and his officials 
declined. In other words, the shrinking space for the emperor’s participation in politics resulted in the dominance of 
autocratic grand councilors. The discussion of imperial audiences in the first section of this article illuminates the 
essence of this issue. The political pattern allowing different opinions from various officials, a pattern represented 
by “memorializing in separate groups,” was replaced by the practice of “memorializing in a combined group.” I 
argue that the change, by excluding other officials in decision-making, strengthened the ties between the emperor 
and state councilors, and especially between the emperor and certain grand councilors. In a similar fashion, from the 
end of the Northern Song on, the practice of “imperial handwritten edicts” was developed, in which the emperor and 
grand councilors made policies through the exchange of documents.44 “The imperial handwritten edicts” replaced 
the traditional form of document processing, which had revolved around the Three Departments and Six Ministries, 
with a new mechanism of decision-making involving only the emperor and grand councilors.
At the very beginning of this article, I proposed to reconcile the two arguments of “imperial autocracy” and “the 
rising power of grand councilors.” Based on the discussion above, I argue there is no big discrepancy between these 
two. If we take a macroscopic perspective to examine the political system, it is clear that while the field administra-
tion changed from the Northern Song “Kaifeng system” into the Southern Song “Hangzhou system,” the system of 
imperial autocracy at the higher level did not change much between the Northern Song and the Southern Song. On 
the other hand, if we take a microscopic perspective, changes took place in the nature of the relations between the 
emperor and officials, as well as in the methods of policy making, which were closely connected to imperial power. 
Some aspects of the political system of imperial autocracy failed to function fully, and thus led to the monopoly of 
power by autocratic grand councilors. The above is my understanding of the debate regarding these two arguments 
so far. To examine “politics” at multiple levels and from various perspectives should be a task for future studies on 
Song political history.
44.  For my arguments concerning imperial handwritten edicts, see Hirata (2008). Furthermore, Tokunaga (1998) argues that “imperial 
handwritten edicts” gradually became the center of the official document system between the late Northern Song and Southern Song. 
Regarding this institution Tokunaga says: “Studies on the institution of imperial handwritten edicts should not neglect its impacts on later 
dynasties. It presaged a system where the emperor meticulously discussed with grand councilors before making the decisions that were 
directly sent to administrations under the Six Ministries for execution. It was also closely connected to Ming dynasty institutions such as 
the Grand Secretariat, eunuchs of Directorate of Ceremonial, and Seal-holding Directors.” Tokunaga perceived the institution of imperial 
handwritten edicts to be the origin of Grand Secretariat’s notes in the Ming dynasty.
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Editor’s notes
This article was translated by Shan (Zoe) Lin (Department of History, University of California, Davis) under 
the supervision of Beverly Bossler (Department of History, University of California, Davis), Masayuki Ueno and 
Ian Richards (Editorial Board). For the convenience of English readers, the translated article was fully reviewed and 
necessary information was added.
